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Abstract. We analyze the security of two multipartite quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols, specifically we introduce an N -partite version of the BB84 protocol
and we discuss the N -partite six-state protocol proposed in [5]. The security analysis
proceeds from the generalization of known results in bipartite QKD to the multipartite
scenario, and takes into account finite resources. In this context we derive a computable
expression for the achievable key rate of both protocols by employing the best-known
strategies: the uncertainty relation and the postselection technique. We compare the
performances of the two protocols both for finite resources and infinitely many signals.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) represents one of the primary applications of
quantum information science. Since the proposal of the first QKD protocols [1,2], major
advancements have been achieved both on the theoretical and experimental side [3,4]. A
QKD protocol provides a systematic procedure through which two honest parties (Alice
and Bob) generate a secret shared key, when connected by an insecure quantum channel
and an authenticated insecure classical channel.
Recently the generalization of such protocols to multipartite schemes has been
investigated [5,6]. It has been shown that there are quantum-network configurations [5]
or noise regimes [6] in which the execution of a multipartite scheme is advantageous
with respect to establishing a multipartite secret key via many independent bipartite
protocols. However, the analysis of multipartite QKD protocols has only been carried
out in the unrealistic scenario of infinitely many signals exchanged through the quantum
channel.
We compare the performances of two multipartite QKD protocols, which constitute the
N -partite versions of the asymmetric BB84 [1] and the asymmetric six-state protocol [7],
and will be denoted as N -BB84 and N -six-state protocol. While the N -six-state protocol
was first proposed in [5], the N -BB84 constitutes a novel multipartite QKD protocol.
Our analysis is conducted in the practical case of a finite amount of resources (signals)
at the N parties’ disposal. The action of a potential eavesdropper (Eve) on the insecure
quantum channel is not restricted at all, as she is allowed to perform any kind of
attack (coherent attacks) on the exchanged signals. What is assumed is that the parties
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have access to true randomness and that the devices performing measurements on the
quantum systems work according to their ideal functionality.
The article is structured as follows. In Sec. 1 we extend notions and results of bipartite-
QKD security analysis to the multipartite scenario. In Sec. 2 we review the N -six-state
protocol and introduce the N -BB84 protocol. Then we obtain a computable expression
for their secret key lengths in the case of finite resources. In Sec. 3 we compare the
achievable key rates of the two NQKD protocols in the presence of finite and infinite
resources. We conclude the article in Sec. 4.
1. Multipartite QKD: general framework and achievable key length
Throughout the article we refer to the parties involved in an N -partite QKD protocol
(NQKD) in the following way: A for Alice, B for the set of N − 1 Bobs, Bi for Bob
in position i and E for the eavesdropper Eve. The definitions of distance and entropic
quantities employed in this Section are given in Appendix A.
The aim of an NQKD protocol is to establish a common secret key, sometimes also
referred to as conference key, between all N (trusted) parties. We consider the following
general NQKD protocol. Although the protocol is presented in an entanglement-based
view for clarity, there exists an equivalent prepare-and-measure scheme which requires
the adoption of multipartite entangled states only for a small fraction of rounds (see the
protocols in Sec. 2).
The protocol starts with the distribution of a finite number of signals -described by
genuinely multipartite entangled states- over the insecure quantum channel. All parties
perform local measurements on their respective quantum systems, collecting classical
data. A short pre-shared random key indicates to the parties the type of measurement
to be performed on each individual state they hold (more on this in Sec. 2).
In the parameter estimation (PE) step the parties reveal a random sample of the
collected data, over the insecure classical channel. This allows them to estimate
the noise occurring in the quantum channel and thus to determine the secret key
length. At this point the raw keys held by the parties are partially correlated and
partially secret. In order to correct the errors in the raw keys, A performs pairwise
an information reconciliation procedure with every Bi. The procedure consists in some
classical communication occurring between A and Bi, which allows Bi to compute a
guess of A’s raw key. We will refer to this procedure as error correction (EC). At last
the shared raw key is turned into a secret key with privacy amplification (PA). Each
party applies the same randomly chosen hash function to his/her raw key, where the
final length of the key depends on the error rates observed in PE and the desired level
of security. Finally all parties share the same secret key.
During the execution of the NQKD protocol, one or more of the described subprotocols
might fail to produce the desired output, thus causing the abortion of the entire protocol.
In the security analysis this is accounted for by the definition of robustness:
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Definition 1 [8]. An NQKD protocol is εrob-robust on ρAB if, for inputs defined by
ρAB, the probability that the protocol aborts is at most εrob.
In order to study the effects of finite resources on an NQKD protocol, one needs to
extend the concept of ε-security of a key [8] to the multi-partite scenario:
Definition 2 [8], [9]. Let ρABE be a density operator. Any NQKD protocol, which is
εrob-robust on TrE[ρABE], is said to be εtot-secure on ρABE if the following inequality
holds:
(1− εrob)1
2
‖ρSASBE′ − ρU ⊗ ρE′‖ ≤ εtot (1.1)
where ρSASBE′ is the density operator describing the final keys held by the N parties
and Eve’s enlarged subsystem HE′ (including the information of the classical channels),
while ρU is the uniform state on the key space of the N parties:
ρU ≡
∑
s∈S
1
|S|
N⊗
i=1
|s〉〈s| (1.2)
with S the set of possible secret keys.
The total security parameter εtot quantifies the deviation of the NQKD protocol from
an ideal protocol, i.e. one that either outputs a set of perfectly-correlated and fully-
secret keys or aborts. In other words, an NQKD protocol is εtot-secure if it behaves
like an ideal protocol except for probability εtot. With this definition, the parameter
that actually accounts for the correctness and secrecy of the protocol when it does not
abort, is: εtot/(1 − εrob). An NQKD protocol may deviate from an ideal one if, for
instance, its EC procedure fails to correct all the errors between A and B’s strings. In
particular, if the probability that at least one Bi holds a different string than A -after
EC- is εEC, then the NQKD protocol is εtot-secure, with εtot ≥ εEC. Formally, the EC
failure probability is defined as:
Definition 3 [8]. Let PXK be a probability distribution. Any set of error correction
protocols {ECi}N−1i=1 , which is εrob-robust on PXK, is said to be εEC-secure on PXK if the
following holds:
(1− εrob)Pr
[
∃i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} : kˆi 6= x
]
≤ εEC (1.3)
where the guess kˆi is computed by Bi according to protocol ECi, and the probability is
computed for inputs (x,k) chosen according to PXK, conditioned on the fact that no ECi
aborted. If {ECi}N−1i=1 is εEC-secure for any probability distribution, it is εEC-fully secure.
In this article we assume that the NQKD protocol may abort only during the EC
procedure. Thus the abortion probability of the chosen set of EC procedures is also the
abortion probability of the whole protocol§.
The classical communication occurring during EC contains some information about the
§ Note, however, that a higher global abortion probability for fixed security parameter εtot may lead
to higher key rates.
Finite-key effects in multi-partite quantum key distribution protocols 4
key. The amount of information about the key that is leaked to E from the insecure
classical channel is quantified by the leakage:
Definition 4 [8]. Let {ECi}N−1i=1 be a set of EC protocols. The NQKD protocol adopting
such a set of protocols for error correction has leakage:
leakNQKD{ECi} ≡ log2|C1,...,N−1| −minx,k Hmin
(
PC|X=x,K=k
)
(1.4)
where C1,...,N−1 is the set of (N − 1)-tuples representing all possible communication
transcripts allowed by the chosen EC protocols, i.e.:
C1,...,N−1 = {(c1, . . . , cN−1) : PC(c1, . . . , cN−1) 6= 0} , (1.5)
PC|X=x,K=k is the transcripts’ distribution conditioned on A and B’s raw keys and
Hmin
(
PC|X=x,K=k
)
is the min-entropy defined on a probability distribution (A.10,A.11).
We now present our results on the achievable key length (Th. 1) and the minimum
leakage (Th. 2) of a general εtot-secure NQKD protocol, which constitute a generalization
of analogous results [8, Lemmas 6.4.1 and 6.3.4] valid for bipartite QKD. The general
structure of the proofs is derived from the bipartite case, but deals with the new
definitions of security and leakage (Def. 2, 3, 4) for multipartite schemes. As in the
bipartite case, the security of an NQKD protocol can be inferred by correctness and
secrecy (Appendix B). While the correctness of a protocol is determined by its EC
procedure, the secrecy is linked to the final-key length via the leftover hashing lemma [8,
Corollary 5.6.1]. In fact, in PA the parties map their shared key to another key which is
short enough to be secret (i.e. unknown to the eavesdropper Eve). In Th. 1 we present
the achievable key length of an εtot-secure NQKD protocol for a general two-way EC
procedure, while typically only the special case of one-way EC is addressed. This is
achieved thanks to the result on the information leakage with two-way EC presented in
Appendix E [10]. A detailed version of the proofs of Th. 1 and Th. 2 is presented in
Appendix B.
Theorem 1 Let: ε¯ > 0, εEC > 0, εPA > 0, εrob ≥ 0 and ρABE be a density operator.
Let ρXKE be the output -prior to EC and PA- of an NQKD protocol applied to ρABE.
If the two-way EC protocol {ECi}N−1i=1 is εEC-secure and εrob-robust on the distribution
defined by ρXK, and if PP{ECi},F is the post-processing protocol defined by the set of EC
protocols and by the set of two-universal hash functions F with co-domain {0, 1}` such
that∗ the secret key length ` fulfills:
` ≤ H ε¯,Pmin (ρXE|E)− leakNQKD{ECi} − 2 log2
1− εrob
2 εPA
, (1.6)
then the NQKD protocol is εtot-secure on ρABE, where εtot is defined as:
εtot = 2ε¯+ εEC + εPA.
If one restricts to one-way EC, the same result holds but with the ε¯-environment of the
min-entropy defined via the trace distance.
∗ The ε¯-environment of the min-entropy is defined via the purified distance, see Appendix A.
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Theorem 2 Given a probability distribution PXK, there exists a 1-way EC protocol that
is: εEC-fully secure, 2(N − 1)ε′-robust on PXK, and has leakage:
leakNQKDEC ≤ max
i
Hε
′
0 (PXKi |Ki) + log2
2(N − 1)
εEC
(1.7)
The upper bound in Th. 2 is independent of the EC protocol, thus also bounds the
leakage of an optimal 1-way EC protocol which is εEC-fully secure and 2(N − 1)ε′-robust
on PXK.
2. N-BB84 and N-six-state protocol
Here we present the two NQKD protocols whose performance will be investigated in
Sec. 3. We introduce the N -BB84 protocol which is the N -partite version of the
asymmetric BB84 protocol [1]:
N-BB84 protocol
(i) Distribution of N -qubit GHZ states:
|GHZ〉N ≡
1√
2
(
|0〉⊗N + |1〉⊗N
)
(2.1)
for L rounds.
(ii) In 1st-type rounds each party measures in the Z-basis, in 2nd-type rounds -
which occur with probability p]- each party measures in the X-basis. The total
number of 2nd-type rounds is: m = Lp.
(iii) Parameter estimation:
(a) Computation of QmABi = (1 − 〈ZAZBi〉m)/2 for every Bi, where ZAZBi is
averaged over m 1st-type rounds randomly chosen by Alice. In the ideal
situation: QmABi = 0.
(b) Computation of QmX = (1 − 〈X⊗N〉m)/2, where X⊗N is averaged over the
2nd-type rounds. Note that in the ideal situation: QmX = 0 [5].
(iv) The secret key is obtained from the remaining data of n = L − 2m 1st-type
rounds.
(v) Classical post-processing:
(a) A sends the same EC information to every Bi.
(b) A and B apply the same two-universal hash function to their corrected
data.
] L · h(p) bits of preshared secure key are used to mark the 2nd-type rounds.
Remarks : Note that the frequencies QmABi and Q
m
X observed in the PE step are the
fraction of discordant Z-outcomes between A and Bi and the frequency of the outcome
−1 when the parties measure the operator X⊗N , respectively.
In an equivalent prepare-and-measure scheme, Alice directly produces the (N−1)-qubit
projection of the GHZ state according to her fictitious random outcome and distributes
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it to the Bobs. In particular, she prepares product states if the Z-basis is chosen
and multipartite entangled states when the X-basis is picked. Thus the production of
multipartite entangled states is only required for Lp rounds, while in all other rounds
product states are prepared [5].
For the protocol’s security to hold, the preshared secret key indicating to the parties the
2nd-type rounds needs to be refreshed at every new execution of the protocol. Therefore,
the net amount of new secret key bits produced by one run of the protocol is obtained by
subtracting L ·h(p) bits from the final key length presented in Subsec. 2.1. We take into
account this term for both protocols when investigating their performance in Sec. 3.
We refer to [5] for a detailed description of the steps characterizing the N -six-state
protocol. However, the only actual differences with respect to the N -BB84 protocol
are that: in the 2nd-type rounds each party measures randomly in the X- or Y -basis
and all parties jointly flip their Z-measurement outcomes with probability 1/2. The
bits to be flipped can be announced by Alice after the distribution and measurement of
the states. These operations enable the implementation of the extended depolarization
procedure [5] on the classical data, without adding further quantum gates.
The frequencies observed in the PE step of the N -six-state protocol are again QmABi and
Qm
′
X †, plus QmZ , i.e. the fraction of rounds in which at least one Bob measured a different
Z-outcome than A’s. We will refer to the corresponding probabilities as: PABi , PX and
PZ .
The frequencies observed in the PE steps of both protocols enable to quantify the amount
of noise occurring in the quantum channel. However, these statistics are collected on
finite-size samples, thus they only represent an estimate of the channel’s noise. In
Appendix C we quantitatively describe how the finite statistics of PE characterize the
quantum channel’s noise, for both NQKD protocols.
2.1. Computable key length
In order to employ the results of Sec. 1 in a performance comparison of the two NQKD
protocols one needs to characterize E’s knowledge about the key. This is achieved by
assigning the noise in the quantum channel to eavesdropping. This means, in practice,
that one can bound the unknown entropies with quantities exclusively depending on the
noise affecting the quantum channel. In turn, the channel’s noise is characterized by
the finite PE statistics, as explained above.
As a result, we obtain a computable expression for the achievable key length of both
protocols, that is an expression solely depending on the observed PE statistics, the
desired level of security, and the total number of quantum signals.
The techniques we adopt to obtain a computable key length are the following. We
employ the uncertainty relation (for smooth entropies) presented in [11] for the N -
BB84 protocol, thus showing its first application to NQKD. For the N -six-state protocol
† Since the value of X⊗N must be registered only when an even number of parties measured in the Y
basis, m′ = m/2. See [5] for further details.
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we instead employ the Postselection technique (PS) [12] in combination with the
Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) [8], and we exploit the symmetries induced
by the extended depolarization procedure.
We arrive at the computable key lengths of the N -BB84 and N -six-state protocol:
Theorem 3 The N-BB84 protocol, with the optimal 1-way EC protocol (which is εEC-
fully secure and 2(N−1)εPE -robust) and where the secret key generated by two-universal
hashing has length
` = n
[
1− h (QmX + 2ξ(εx, n,m))−max
i
h
(
QmABi + 2ξ(εz, n,m)
)]− log2 2(N − 1)εEC
−2 log2
1− 2(N − 1)εPE
2 εPA
, (2.2)
is εtot-secure with εtot = 2εPE + εEC + εPA, where εPE is defined as (C.16):
εPE ≡
√
(N − 1)εz + εx (2.3)
and ξ(ε, n,m) as (C.4):
ξ(ε, n,m) ≡
√
(n+m)(m+ 1)
8nm2
ln
(
1
ε
)
. (2.4)
Theorem 4 The N-six-state protocol, with the optimal 1-way EC protocol (which is
εEC-fully secure and 2(N − 1)εPE -robust) and where the secret key generated by two-
universal hashing has length
` = n inf
ΓPE
[(
1− PZ
2
− PX
)
log2
(
1− PZ
2
− PX
)
+
(
PX − PZ
2
)
log2
(
PX − PZ
2
)
+(1− PZ) (1− log2(1− PZ))− 5
√
log2(1/ε¯)
n
−max
i
h (PABi)− log2(5)
√
2 log2(1/(2εPE))
n
]
− log2
2(N − 1)
εEC
− 2 log2
1− 2(N − 1)εPE
2 εPA
− 2(22N − 1) log2(L+ 1) , (2.5)
is εtot-secure with εtot = (L + 1)
(22N−1)(2ε¯ + εPE + εEC + εPA), where PX , PABi and PZ
are minimized over the set:
ΓPE ≡
{
PABi , PZ , PX :
1
2
|QmABi − PABi |≤ η(εz, 2,m) ∀ i
∧ 1
2
|Qm′X − PX |≤ η(εx, 2,m′) ∧
1
2
|QmZ − PZ |≤ η(ε′z, 2,m)
}
. (2.6)
The parameters εx, εz, ε
′
z are linked to εPE via (C.18):
εPE ≡ ε′z + (N − 1)εz + εx (2.7)
while η(ε, d,m) is defined as (C.19):
η(ε, d,m) ≡
√
ln(1/ε) + d ln(m+ 1)
8m
. (2.8)
For the derivation of Th. 3 and Th. 4, we refer to Appendix D.
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3. Performance comparison
We compare the performances of the two NQKD protocols by studying their secret-key
rates, i.e. the fraction of shared secret bits per transmitted quantum signal (`/L). For
this purpose we investigate the computable key lengths (2.2) and (2.5)- corrected with
the term “−L · h(p)” that accounts for the preshared secret key- for a given number of
parties N and a fixed total security parameter εtot.
In order to carry out a fair comparison, we assume that the PE statistics of both
protocols are generated by the same error model.
3.1. Error model
We assume that in every distribution round white noise acted on the ideal state and
that the action of the noise is the same in every round‡. The total distributed state
over all rounds is a product state: ρ⊗LAB, where the single-round state is given by:
ρAB = (1− ν)|GHZ〉N〈GHZ|N + ν
idAB
2N
(3.1)
where ν is the noise parameter and |GHZ〉N is the GHZ state of N qubits (2.1).
The state (3.1) can be seen as the result of the action of a depolarizing channel on the
whole N -qubit system, such that it is diagonal in the GHZ basis [5] and the probabilities
PABi (of A and Bi having discordant Z-outcomes), PX (of having the outcome −1 when
the parties measured X⊗N) and PZ (of having at least one Bob with a different Z-
outcome than A’s) are given by:
PABi = ν/2 ∀ i (3.2)
PX = PAB (3.3)
PZ =
2N − 2
2N−1
PAB . (3.4)
For ease of notation we will drop the index i in the probabilities PABi . We assume that
the frequencies QmABi , Q
m
X and Q
m
Z observed in the PE step of both protocols are linked
by the same relations (3.3), (3.4) that hold for the corresponding probabilities.
3.2. Infinite resources
In the asymptotic limit of infinitely many rounds (L→∞), all the correction terms due
to finite statistics vanish, as well as all the correction terms due to the ε-security of the
key. For instance, the PE frequencies coincide with their corresponding probabilities.
For the assumed error model, the asymptotic key rates of the N -six-state protocol
(r6-state) and the N -BB84 protocol (rBB84) read:
r6-state(PAB, N) =
(
1− PZ
2
− PAB
)
log2
(
1− PZ
2
− PAB
)
‡ The same error model is used, for instance, in [5].
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Fig. 1: Asymptotic key rates (N -six-state solid, N -BB84 dashed) for N = 2, 5,∞ (blue, green,
red) as a function of the probability of discordant Z-outcomes between A and Bi (PAB),
in the presence of a global depolarizing channel (3.1). Due to the symmetric action of
the white noise on the quantum channel: PX = PAB. The N -BB84 asymptotic key rate
presents only one curve since it is independent of N .
+
(
PAB − PZ
2
)
log2
(
PAB − PZ
2
)
+ (1− PZ) (1− log2(1− PZ))− h (PAB) (3.5)
rBB84(PAB) = 1− 2h(PAB) (3.6)
where PZ is fixed by (3.4) and the rates have been maximized over the probability p
of performing 2nd-type rounds. For N = 2 the rate (3.5) reduces to the asymptotic
rate of the bipartite six-state protocol [3], while (3.6) is independent of N -for fixed
PAB- and coincides with the asymptotic bipartite BB84 rate [3]. The reason for which
(3.6) does not depend on N is that the N -BB84 protocol -unlike the N -six-state- does
not completely characterize the state shared by all the parties, thus its asymptotic rate
only depends on PAB and PX . For the highly symmetric error model introduced in
Subsec. 3.1, it holds: PX = PAB = ν/2 which is independent of the number of parties
involved.
In figure 1 we plot the asymptotic rate of both protocols as a function of the probability
of discordant raw key bits between A and Bi (PAB), for various numbers of parties N .
By noting that the N -six-state protocol outperforms the N -BB84 for equal PAB and
any number of parties N , we observe in the N -partite asymptotic scenario that a six-
state-type protocol produces higher rates than a BB84 one, extending known results of
the bipartite case [3].
Interestingly, the rate of both protocols does not decrease for an increasing number of
parties and fixed PAB. However, one should keep in mind that increasing N for fixed
PAB may not be physically reasonable. In fact, according to our error model, if PAB
is fixed then also the noise parameter ν (quantifying the amount of depolarization on
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all N qubits) is fixed, and increasing N with a fixed noise parameter may not describe
realistic quantum channels. Consider, for instance, the case in which part of the noise
generating PAB is due to the failure of imperfect bipartite gates used for the distribution
of the GHZ state. Then an increase of N , obtained by adding gates with the same failure
probability, would lead to an increase of PAB [5].
Moreover, the adoption of other error models can lead to key rates decreasing in the
number of parties, for fixed PAB. For instance if the noise on the ideal distributed state
is modeled as the independent action of the depolarizing map
D(ρ) = (1− ν)ρ+ ν id2
2
(3.7)
on each Bi, i.e. the single-round state reads:
ρAB = D⊗(N−1) (|GHZ〉N〈GHZ|N) , (3.8)
then the probabilities of interest are given by:
PAB = ν/2 (3.9)
PX =
1− (1− 2PAB)N−1
2
(3.10)
PZ = 1− (1− PAB)N−1 (3.11)
where we dropped the index i in the probabilities PABi . The asymptotic key rates of
the N -BB84 and N -six-state protocol computed with the new probabilities (3.9), (3.10)
and (3.11) decrease for increasing number of parties, see figure 2.
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Fig. 2: Asymptotic key rates (N -six-
state solid, N -BB84 dashed)
for N = 2, 5, 10 (blue, green,
red) as a function of the
probability of discordant Z-
outcomes between A and Bi
(PAB), in the presence of local
depolarizing channels (3.8).
With this model the rate of
both protocols decreases for
increasing number of parties
and fixed PAB.
3.3. Finite resources
In figure 3 we compare the key rates of both NQKD protocols for a finite number of
signals L transmitted through the quantum channel, with noise discussed in Subsec. 3.1.
The rates are numerically maximized over the parameters: p, ε¯, εPE, εEC, εPA, with the
constraint given by the fixed value of the total security parameter: εtot = 5 · 10−9. The
fact that we are still able to obtain non-zero rates in the finite-key scenario means that
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the correction term “−h(p)” due to the preshared secret key is not prominent, as a
matter of fact the optimal values for p are typically well below 0.1.
We observe that, although for large L the N -six-state still performs better than the
N -BB84 protocol, there exists a certain number of rounds -identified by the threshold
function L¯(QmAB, N)- below which the N -six-state protocol is outperformed by the N -
BB84 protocol. The threshold function L¯ is defined as:
L¯(QmAB, N) = minL s.t. r6-state(L,Q
m
AB, N) ≥ rBB84(L,QmAB, N) . (3.12)
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(a) Key rates as a function of the total number
of rounds L for N = 2, 5, 8 (blue, green,
red; left to right) and fixed QmAB = 0.05.
Note that even for finite number of
rounds the N -BB84 rate is approximately
independent of N .
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(b) Key rates as a function of the total number
of rounds L for QmAB = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1
(blue, green, red; left to right) and fixed
N = 5.
Fig. 3: Key rates (N -six-state solid,N -BB84 dashed) as a function of the number of signals L.
(a) Threshold function L¯ for
QmAB = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 (blue circles, green
squares, red diamonds) as a function of the
number of parties N .
(b) Threshold function L¯ for N = 2, 5, 8 (blue
circles, green squares, red diamonds) as
a function of QmAB, proportional to the
channel noise.
Fig. 4: The threshold L¯ as a function of one of its variables, while keeping the other one fixed.
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From figure 3a one deduces that the N -six-state protocol is much more sensitive than
the N -BB84 if the number of parties is increased, displaying the opposite behavior with
respect to the asymptotic case (figure 1). This causes the threshold function to increase
with N and fixed QmAB (figure 4a).
On the other hand, the N -six-state protocol is more robust than the N -BB84 protocol
when the quantum channels become noisier (figure 3b). As a result the threshold
function decreases for increasing noise and fixed N (figure 4b).
We point out that the function L¯ may not be a physical threshold for the number of
rounds above which the N -six-state protocol is more efficient than the N -BB84 protocol,
as the achievable key rates depend on quantitatively different estimates. As a matter of
fact, it is known [11] that the uncertainty relation employed for the N -BB84 protocol
yields tighter bounds compared to the PS technique used for the N -six-state protocol,
especially for low values of L. Instead, asymptotically the correction terms introduced
by the PS technique and the uncertainty relation vanish†, allowing the N -six-state to
outperform the N -BB84 protocol (figure 1). Therefore the crossover between the two
key rates at L¯ is mainly caused by the different tightness of the min-entropy bounds
used in the two protocols.
Moreover, the PS corrections become more pronounced for increasing number of parties,
thus explaining the rise of the threshold function with N . Indeed, the reduction in the
key length scales quadratically with the dimension d of the Hilbert space of a single-
signal state shared by all N parties. Since we assume that the quantum system held by
each party is a qubit, d = 2N , i.e. the reduction in the key length introduced by the PS
technique scales exponentially in N .
3.4. Why different strategies?
In Subsec. 3.3 we argued that the N -BB84 protocol outperforms the N -six-state
protocol, at low values of L, due to the adoption of tighter bounds on the min-entropy.
One could wonder what would happen if the same strategy were used in obtaining the
computable key length for both protocols. Unfortunately, this is not possible: the two
strategies employed (uncertainty relation and PS technique) are suited to the particular
protocol to which they are applied and they cannot be used in the other protocol.
In principle the uncertainty relation may also be used to bound the min-entropy of
the N -six-state protocol, but then the additional symmetries due to the extended
depolarization procedure would be ignored, such that one ends with the same key length
as for the N -BB84 protocol.
Conversely, one could employ the PS technique in combination with the AEP to bound
the min-entropy of the N -BB84 protocol. The problem in this case would be the lack
of information provided by any symmetrization procedure performed on the shared
† Recall that the correction terms due to PS allow to extend the security of the key against collective
attacks to coherent attacks, however in the asymptotic limit these attacks are equivalent [13], thus the
PS corrections vanish.
Finite-key effects in multi-partite quantum key distribution protocols 13
signals. Indeed without any further symmetrization, the degrees of freedom of the shared
signals‡, reduced by the PE observations, would still be too many to find a computable
bound to the min-entropy (i.e. a bound that only depends on the PE statistics and on
the input parameters).
4. Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we presented the first complete finite-key analysis of two N -partite QKD
(NQKD) protocols, which can be regarded as the multipartite versions of the BB84 [1]
and of the six-state [7] protocol. Although both protocols adopt genuinely multipartite
entangled states as resources, these states are only required for a small number of rounds,
while in the majority of the cases product states are distributed.
In order to study finite-size effects in NQKD schemes, we extended the information
theoretic security analysis [8] of bipartite QKD protocols to the multipartite case,
taking into account both one-way and two-way error correction protocols. Then we
employed the general results on the security of NQKD to investigate the N -six-state
protocol [5] and the newly-defined N -BB84 protocol. In particular, we derived analytical
formulas for the achievable secret key length of both protocols which only depend on
the parameter estimation statistics and on the desired level of security. We achieved
this by bounding the knowledge of the eavesdropper about the secret key by means of
the best-known strategies adopted in bipartite QKD, namely the uncertainty relation
for smooth entropies [11] and the postselection technique [12].
We compared the performance of the two NQKD protocols in the case of finite resources
and in the asymptotic limit. We observed that, although theN -six-state protocol reaches
higher rates asymptotically, there exists a threshold value for the number of signals
below which it is outperformed by the N -BB84 protocol. We argued that this crossover
between the rates of the two protocols is caused by the different strategies adopted in
obtaining the computable key lengths, and we justified the choice of the strategy for
each protocol.
In order to carry out a fairer comparison between the N -six-state protocol and the
N -BB84 when the number of available resources is low, it would be desirable to
implement tighter bounds for the min-entropy of the former protocol. In any case,
the framework of NQKD ε-security developed in this paper may be used for the finite-
key analysis of other multipartite QKD protocols.
This work is based on the assumptions that the measurement devices are ideal and that
the parties have access to true randomness. In order to address more realistic scenarios,
one can consider the fact that the measurements in the Z and X bases are not necessarily
projective measurements in diagonal bases, but rather generic positive operator-valued
measurements. This fact could be easily implemented in our N -BB84 protocol, thanks to
the properties of the uncertainty relation [14]. A more drastic approach is represented by
‡ Remember that we are considering N -qubit states, thus their degrees of freedom are much more than
in the bipartite case.
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device-independent QKD (DIQKD) [15,16], where no assumption is made on the devices
except for spatial separation. In this context it is worth mentioning the recent security
proof of a multipartite DIQKD protocol [6]. In that protocol security is guaranteed for
every violation of a bipartite Bell inequality (CHSH inequality [17]) between one of the
parties and the other N − 1. It is not yet known whether security can still be proven
for violations of a multipartite Bell inequality (MABK inequality [18–20]) that do not
necessarily imply CHSH violations.
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Appendix A. Notation
• The binary entropy function is defined as: h(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p),
for p ∈ [0, 1].
• The norm ‖·‖ of an operator O is defined as: ‖O‖ = Tr[
√
O†O].
• P(H) is the set of positive-semidefinite operators on the Hilbert space H.
• The set of possible secret keys shared by the parties is S.
• The set of operators which are ε-close to a given density operator ρ is defined as:
Bε(ρ) ≡
{
τ ∈ P(H) : Tr[τ ] ≤ 1 , 1
2
‖τ − ρ‖ ≤ ε
}
(A.1)
if the distance is computed with respect to the trace distance, or as:
Bε,P(ρ) ≡ {τ ∈ P(H) : Tr[τ ] ≤ 1 , P (τ, ρ) ≤ ε} (A.2)
if the distance is given by the purified distance [21]:
P (τ, ρ) ≡
√
1− F¯ (τ, ρ)2
where F¯ (τ, ρ) is called generalized fidelity:
F¯ (τ, ρ) ≡ Tr|√τ√ρ|+
√
(1− Tr ρ)(1− Tr τ) . (A.3)
Since the purified distance is an upper bound to the trace distance [21], it holds:
Bε,P(ρ) ⊆ Bε(ρ) . (A.4)
• We say that ρX is the operator representation of the probability distribution PX
on the set X if:
ρX ≡
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| (A.5)
for some orthonormal basis {|x〉}x.
• We define the set of probability distributions which are ε-close to a given probability
distribution PX as those distributions whose operator representation is ε-close to
the operator representation of PX , according to (A.1) and (A.2).
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• The Re´nyi zero-entropy H0(PXY |Y ) of the probability distribution PXY over the
set X × Y is given by [8, 22]:
H0(PXY |Y ) ≡ log2 max
y∈Y
|supp(P yX)| (A.6)
where P yX denotes the function P
y
X : x 7→ PXY (x, y). This entropy was called
“max-entropy” in [8].
• The ε-smooth Re´nyi zero-entropy Hε0(PXY |Y ) is defined as [8, 23]:
Hε0(PXY |Y ) ≡ min
QXY ∈Bε(PXY )
H0(QXY |Y ) . (A.7)
If the minimization is performed on Bε,P(PXY ) the corresponding Re´nyi
zero-entropy is denoted as: Hε,P0 (PXY |Y ).
• The Re´nyi zero-entropy H0(ρ) of the density operator ρ is defined as [8]:
H0(ρ) ≡ log2 rank(ρ) (A.8)
• The min-entropy of the density operator ρAB relative to σB is [8, 22]:
Hmin(ρAB|σB) ≡ − log2 min {λ ∈ R : λ(idA ⊗ σB)− ρAB ≥ 0 } (A.9)
Note that for Hmin(ρAB|σB) to exist, a necessary condition is that:
supp(ρB) ⊆ supp(σB). If HB is the trivial space C, then the min-entropy reduces
to:
Hmin(ρA) = − log2 λmax(ρA) (A.10)
where λmax(ρA) is the maximum eigenvalue of ρA.
• The min-entropy of the probability distribution PXY relative to the distribution QY
is [8]:
Hmin(PXY |QY ) ≡ Hmin(ρXY |σY ) (A.11)
where ρXY and σY are the operators representations (A.5) of PXY and QY ,
respectively.
• The min-entropy of A conditioned on B of the density operator ρAB is [8, 22,24]:
Hmin(ρAB|B) ≡ − log2 min{TrσB : σB ∈ P(HB) , (idA ⊗ σB)− ρAB ≥ 0} (A.12)
• The ε-smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on B of the state ρAB is [8, 22]:
Hεmin(ρAB|B) ≡ max
ρ˜AB∈Bε(ρAB)
Hmin(ρ˜AB|B) . (A.13)
If the maximization is performed on Bε,P(ρAB) the corresponding min-entropy is
denoted as: Hε,Pmin(ρAB|B).
• The max-entropy of A conditioned on B of the density operator ρAB is [22]:
Hmax(ρAB|B) ≡ −Hmin(ρAC |C) (A.14)
where the min-entropy of the r.h.s. is evaluated for a purification ρABC of ρAB.
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• The ε-smooth max-entropy of A conditioned on B of the density operator ρAB
is [22]:
Hεmax(ρAB|B) ≡ min
ρ˜AB∈Bε(ρAB)
Hmax(ρ˜AB|B) . (A.15)
If the minimization is performed on Bε,P(ρAB) the corresponding max-entropy is
denoted as: Hε,Pmax(ρAB|B).
Appendix B. Further NQKD definitions and theorems’ proofs
In this appendix we prove the two results (Th. 1 and Th. 2) presented in Sec. 1.
First we show that correctness and secrecy of a protocol are a sufficient condition for
security (Def. 2), analogously to the bipartite case [8, 9]:
Definition 5 [6], [14]. Let ρABE be a density operator. Any NQKD protocol, which is
εrob-robust on TrE[ρABE], is said to be ε
′-correct on ρABE if:
(1− εrob)Pr [∃i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} : sA 6= sBi ] ≤ ε′ (B.1)
where (sA, sB) are the secret keys generated by the NQKD protocol and the probability
is conditioned on the fact that the protocol did not abort.
Note that the definition of robustness of an NQKD protocol is given in Def. 1.
Definition 6 [6], [14]. Let ρABE be a density operator. Any NQKD protocol, which is
εrob-robust on TrE[ρABE], is said to be ε
′′-secret on ρABE if:
(1− εrob)1
2
‖ρSAE′ − ρU ⊗ ρE′‖ ≤ ε′′ (B.2)
where ρU is the uniform state on A’s key space.
The following lemma holds:
Lemma 1 Given an NQKD protocol which is ε′-correct and ε′′-secret, then it is also
(ε′ + ε′′)-secure.
Proof. From the correctness hypothesis we have:
Pr [∃i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} : sA 6= sBi ] = 1− Pr [@i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} : sA 6= sBi ] =
= 1−
∑
s∈S
PSASB(s, . . . , s) = 1−
∑
sA,sB
PSASB(sA, sB)δsAsB
where δsAsB ≡ ΠN−1i=1 δsAsBi . Therefore, ε′-correctness yields:∑
sA,sB
PSASB(sA, sB)(1− δsAsB) ≤
ε′
1− εrob . (B.3)
From the secrecy hypothesis we have:
1
2
‖ρSAE′ − ρU ⊗ ρE′‖ =
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∑
sA,sB
PSASB(sA, sB)|sA〉〈sA| ⊗ ρsA,sBE′ −
∑
sA
1
|S| |sA〉〈sA| ⊗ ρE′
∥∥∥∥∥
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=
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∑
sA
|sA〉〈sA| ⊗
(∑
sB
PSASB(sA, sB)ρ
sA,sB
E′ −
1
|S|ρE′
)∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
2
∑
sA
∥∥∥∥∥∑
sB
PSASB(sA, sB)ρ
sA,sB
E′ −
1
|S|ρE′
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ε′′1− εrob . (B.4)
Having obtained inequalities (B.3) and (B.4), we are ready to prove the thesis:
1
2
‖ρSASBE′ − ρU ⊗ ρE′‖ =
=
1
2
∥∥∥∥ ∑
sA,sB
PSASB(sA, sB)|sA〉〈sA| ⊗ |sB〉〈sB| ⊗ ρsA,sBE′
−
∑
sA,sB
1
|S|δsAsB|sA〉〈sA| ⊗ |sB〉〈sB| ⊗ ρE′
∥∥∥∥
=
1
2
∑
sA,sB
∥∥∥∥PSASB(sA, sB)ρsA,sBE′ − δsAsB|S| ρE′
∥∥∥∥
=
1
2
[∑
sA,sB
(1− δsAsB)
∥∥∥∥PSASB(sA, sB)ρsA,sBE′ − δsAsB|S| ρE′
∥∥∥∥
+
∑
sA,sB
δsAsB
∥∥∥∥PSASB(sA, sB)ρsA,sBE′ − δsAsB|S| ρE′
∥∥∥∥
]
=
1
2
[∑
sA,sB
(1− δsAsB) ‖PSASB(sA, sB)ρsA,sBE′ ‖ +
∑
sA
∥∥∥∥PSASB(sA, . . . , sA)ρsA,...,sAE′ − 1|S|ρE′
∥∥∥∥
]
(1)
≤ ε
′
2(1− εrob) +
1
2
∑
sA
∥∥∥∥PSASB(sA, . . . , sA)ρsA,...,sAE′ − 1|S|ρE′
∥∥∥∥
(2)
≤ ε
′
2(1− εrob) +
1
2
∑
sA
∥∥∥∥∥PSASB(sA, . . . , sA)ρsA,...,sAE′ −∑
sB
PSASB(sA, sB)ρ
sA,sB
E′
∥∥∥∥∥
+
1
2
∑
sA
∥∥∥∥∥∑
sB
PSASB(sA, sB)ρ
sA,sB
E′ −
1
|S|ρE′
∥∥∥∥∥
(3)
≤ ε
′
2(1− εrob) +
ε′′
1− εrob +
1
2
∑
sA
∥∥∥∥∥∑
sB
PSASB(sA, sB)ρ
sA,sB
E′ (1− δsAsB)
∥∥∥∥∥
(4)
≤ ε
′
2(1− εrob) +
ε′′
1− εrob +
1
2
∑
sA,sB
‖PSASB(sA, sB)ρsA,sBE′ (1− δsAsB)‖
(5)
≤ ε
′
1− εrob +
ε′′
1− εrob (B.5)
which concludes the proof according to the security definition in Def. 2. Note that
we made use of the following properties: (1) the fact that the operator ρsA,sBE′ is
normalized and (B.3); (2) triangle inequality; (3) (B.4); (4) triangle inequality; (5) ρsA,sBE′
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is normalized and (B.3). 
We now prove the result on the achievable key length of a general NQKD protocol:
Proof of Th. 1. In the post-processing protocol PP{ECi},F , the sub-protocol which
transforms partially correlated key pairs into fully correlated ones is defined by the
set {ECi}N−1i=1 . Because {ECi}N−1i=1 is εEC-secure (in the sense of Def. 3) on the classical
probability distribution defined by ρXK, according to Def. 5 the whole NQKD protocol is
εEC-correct on ρABE. Thus by Lemma 1 we only need to show that the NQKD protocol
is (2ε¯+ εPA)-secret in order to complete the proof, i.e. :
1
2
‖ρSAE′ − ρU ⊗ ρE′‖ ≤
2ε¯+ εPA
1− εrob . (B.6)
We stress the fact that in Eve’s subsystem E ′ we included not only Eve’s quantum
degree of freedom HE, but also her knowledge about the classical communication HC
occurring during error correction (defined by {ECi}) and the classical communication
taking place in privacy amplification HF (defined by the set F).
In order to prove (B.6), we start from the result in [8, Corollary 5.6.1] stated in a slightly
weaker form:
‖ρSAE′ − ρU ⊗ ρE′‖ ≤
4ε¯ ′
1− εrob + 2
− 1
2
(
H ε¯
′
min(ρXCE |CE)−`
)
(B.7)
valid ∀ ε¯ ′, where ` is the number of key bits after privacy amplification. The inequality
(B.7) leads to a sufficient condition for (B.6) to be true, namely:
H ε¯
′
min(ρXCE|CE)− ` ≥ 2 log2
1− εrob
2(2ε¯+ εPA − 2ε¯ ′) (B.8)
therefore we will now focus on proving (B.8), having fixed: ε¯ ′ = ε¯.
We first prove the result without assuming that the classical communication C is one-
way, i.e. it may also depend on B’s raw keys. Then we show how to achieve a slightly
stronger result by assuming one-way classical communication.
TWO-WAY EC: Since the purified distance is an upper bound to the trace distance,
an ε-environment defined with the latter is larger (A.4). Thus:
H ε¯min(ρXCE|CE) ≥ H ε¯,Pmin(ρXCE|CE) . (B.9)
The result stated in Appendix E yields:
H ε¯,Pmin(ρXCE|CE) ≥ H ε¯,Pmin(ρXE|E)− (H0(ρC)−Hmin(ρXKC|ρXK)) . (B.10)
Now let us concentrate on the last two terms in (B.10):
(i) By definition (A.8): H0(ρC) = log2 rank(ρC), with:
ρC =
∑
c1,...,cN−1
PC(c1, . . . , cN−1)
N−1⊗
i=1
|ci〉〈ci| , (B.11)
therefore rank(ρC) = |C1,...,N−1| according to (1.5).
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(ii) By definition (A.9): Hmin(ρXKC|ρXK) = − log2 minλ, where λ is a real parameter
satisfying:
λ(ρXK ⊗ idC)− ρXKC ≥ 0
⇐⇒ λ ≥ PC|X=x,K=k(c1, . . . , cN−1|x,k) ∀x,k, c1, . . . , cN−1 .
Therefore
minλ = max
c,k,x
PC|X=x,K=k(c1, . . . , cN−1|x,k) , (B.12)
which yields:
Hmin(ρXKC|ρXK) = min
x,k
[
− log2 max
c
PC|X=x,K=k(c1, . . . , cN−1|x,k)
]
=
= min
x,k
Hmin(PC|X=x,K=k)
where in the last inequality we used the definition of min-entropy for probability
distributions (A.11).
Substituting now in (B.10), recalling Def. 4 and using (B.9) yields:
H ε¯min(ρXCE|CE) ≥ H ε¯,Pmin(ρXE|E)− leakNQKD{ECi} . (B.13)
By using the assumption (1.6) in the last inequality concludes the proof:
H ε¯min(ρXCE|CE) ≥ H ε¯,Pmin(ρXE|E)− leakNQKD{ECi}
≥ `+ 2 log2
1− εrob
2 εPA
(B.14)
since we have just obtained (B.8) with fixed ε¯ ′ = ε¯.
ONE-WAY EC: For the chain rule [8, Eq. 3.21] we have:
H ε¯min(ρXCE|CE) ≥ H ε¯min(ρXCE|E)−H0(ρC) , (B.15)
where the quantum state is, under the assumption of one-way EC protocols:
ρˆXCE =
∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρˆxC ⊗ ρxE (B.16)
where the hat ·ˆ indicates normalized density operators and:
ρxE ≡
∑
k
PXK(x,k)ρˆ
x,k
E . (B.17)
Since in (B.16) the state conditioned on the classical subsystem HX is a product state,
by [8, Eq. 3.22] we conclude that:
H ε¯min(ρXCE|E) ≥ H ε¯min(ρXE|E) +Hmin(ρXC|ρX) . (B.18)
Substituting (B.18) in (B.15) yields:
H ε¯min(ρXCE|CE) ≥ H ε¯min(ρXE|E)− (H0(ρC)−Hmin(ρXC|ρX)) , (B.19)
which is equivalent to what was obtained in the two-way scenario (B.10) except for the
ε-environment of the min-entropy, here defined via the trace distance. Analogous steps
to those employed in the first part lead to the claim valid for one-way EC. 
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Finally, we show how to obtain an upper bound on the leakage of an optimal EC protocol.
Proof of Th. 2. Let X be the set of possible raw keys held by A, while K is the set
of possible raw keys held by B. Let us consider the following N -partite one-way error
correction protocol ECXˆ ,F (generalization of the bipartite version in [8, Lemma 6.3.3]):
Parameters:
• Xˆ : family of sets Xˆ iki ⊆ X parametrized by the index i which identifies Bi and
by ki ∈ K.
• F : family of hash functions from X to Z.
Protocol:
(i) A receives as input the raw key x ∈ X , while Bi receives the raw key ki ∈ K.
(ii) A chooses uniformly at random f ∈R F and defines z ≡ f(x). Then, A sends
the classical message (f, z) to B.
(iii) Bi selects the set Xˆ iki corresponding to the key ki he is holding, and defines:
Dˆi ≡ {xˆi ∈ Xˆ iki : f(xˆi) = z}.
(iv) If Dˆi 6= ∅ then Bi’s guess of A’s key is xˆi ∈R Dˆi, otherwise the protocol aborts.
The proof consists of two parts. The first part extends the result stated in [8, Lemma
6.3.3] to the multipartite scenario, while the second part generalizes [8, Lemma 6.3.4].
PART 1: We first show that the above-defined ECXˆ ,F , for an appropriate choice of the
parameters Xˆ and F , is 0-robust on PXK, εEC-fully secure (see Def. 3), and has leakage:
leakNQKDECXˆ ,F
≤ max
i
H0(PXKi |Ki) + log2 (2/εEC) + log2(N − 1) . (B.20)
Let zEC ≡ dmaxiH0(PXKi |Ki)+log2(N−1)+log2(1/εEC)e and let F be a two-universal
family of hash functions from X to Z = {0, 1}zEC . Moreover, let Xˆ = {Xˆ iki} be the
family of sets defined by Xˆ iki ≡ supp(P i,kiX ), where supp(P i,kiX ) denotes the support
of the function: P i,kiX : x 7→ PXKi(x, ki). From the choice of F we know that:
Prf [f(x
′) = f(x)]x′ 6=x ≤ 2−zEC for f ∈R F and fixed elements x, x′ ∈ X . Note that the
two parameters Xˆ ,F defining the EC protocol are completely fixed by the marginals
distributions PXKi of the given probability distribution PXK.
For any given set of raw keys (x, k1, . . . , kN−1) (not necessarily generated by PXK), one
can bound the probability that the protocol ECXˆ ,F does not abort and outputs a wrong
guess for at least one Bob, as:
Prf,xˆ
[
Dˆi 6= ∅ ∀ i ∧ ∃i : xˆi 6= x
]
≤ Prf,xˆ [∃i : xˆi 6= x]
≤ Prf
[
∃xˆ ∈ ∪N−1i=1 Dˆi : xˆ 6= x
]
= Prf
[
∃xˆ ∈ ∪N−1i=1 Xˆ iki : xˆ 6= x ∧ f(xˆ) = f(x)
]
≤
∑
xˆ∈∪N−1i=1 Xˆ iki ,xˆ 6=x
Prf [f(xˆ) 6= f(x)]
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≤
∑
xˆ∈∪N−1i=1 Xˆ iki ,xˆ 6=x
2−zEC (B.21)
where the third inequality is due to the union bound and the fourth to the chosen set
F . Finally, we can bound (B.21) by:
Prf,xˆ
[
Dˆi 6= ∅ ∀ i ∧ ∃i : xˆi 6= x
]
≤
∣∣∣∪N−1i=1 Xˆ iki∣∣∣ 2−zEC
≤ (N − 1) max
i
max
ki
∣∣∣supp(P i,kiX )∣∣∣ 2−zEC
= 2log2(N−1)2maxiH0(PXKi |Ki)2−zEC
≤ εEC
which proves that ECXˆ ,F is εEC-fully secure according to Def. 3. Note that we used
(A.6) for the equality and the definition of zEC in the last inequality.
If the set of keys (x, k1, . . . , kN−1) is now generated by the distribution PXK, then
x ∈ Xˆ iki ∀i since PXKi(x, ki) 6= 0 ∀i (otherwise the pair (x, ki) could not have been
generated). Therefore, being f(x) = z true by definition, the sets Dˆi are never empty,
thus the EC protocol never aborts, i.e. it is 0-robust (Def. 1) on PXK.
Let us now consider the leakage of the protocol ECXˆ ,F . Since it is a one-way EC protocol
where the information sent to one Bob is then copied and then sent to all the other Bobs,
the leakage reads (Def. 4):
leakNQKDECXˆ ,F
= log2|F × Z|−min
x
Hmin(PC|X=x) . (B.22)
For this EC protocol, after having fixed A’s key x, the classical communication (f, z) is
simply depending on the random choice of f , therefore: PC|X=x = 1/|F|. Substituting
in (B.22) yields:
leakNQKDECXˆ ,F
= log2|F × Z|− log2|F|
≤ log2|Z|= zEC
= dmax
i
H0(PXKi |Ki) + log2(N − 1) + log2(1/ε)e
≤ log2 2 + max
i
H0(PXKi |Ki) + log2(N − 1) + log2(1/ε)
= max
i
H0(PXKi |Ki) + log2 (2/ε) + log2(N − 1) ,
which concludes the first part of the proof (B.20).
PART 2: Now we employ the result (B.20) for another protocol ECXˆ ,F where the
parameters Xˆ ,F are defined by a new set of distributions { P¯XKi }N−1i=1 linked to the
marginals of PXK. Such an EC protocol will be the one that satisfies the claim (1.7).
The distributions { P¯XKi }N−1i=1 are obtained by the definition of smooth Re´nyi zero-
entropy (A.7):
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} ∃P¯XKi s.t.∥∥P¯XKi − PXKi∥∥ ≤ 2ε′ ∧ H0(P¯XKi|Ki) = Hε′0 (PXKi |Ki) , (B.23)
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where the distance between two probability distributions is defined as:
‖P −Q‖ =
∑
x
|P (x)−Q(x)| .
We define i¯ ≡ arg maxiH0(P¯XKi |Ki), then (B.23) implies:
max
i
H0(P¯XKi |Ki) = H0(P¯XKi¯ |Ki¯) = Hε
′
0 (PXKi¯ |Ki¯)
≤ max
i
Hε
′
0 (PXKi |Ki) . (B.24)
Let us now consider the protocol ECXˆ ,F where Xˆ and F are fixed by the above-defined
set of distributions { P¯XKi }N−1i=1 . Then, by (B.20) we know that such an EC protocol is
εEC-fully secure and has leakage:
leakNQKDECXˆ ,F
≤ max
i
H0(P¯XKi |Ki) + log2 (2/εEC) + log2(N − 1)
≤ max
i
Hε
′
0 (PXKi |Ki) + log2 (2/εEC) + log2(N − 1)
where we used (B.24) in the second inequality.
The last thing to be shown is that such an EC protocol is also 2(N − 1)ε′-robust on the
distribution PXK:
Pr(x,k)[abort]P ≤ 2(N − 1)ε′ , (B.25)
i.e. the probability that the protocol aborts when initiated with a set of keys (x,k)
generated by the distribution PXK is lower or equal than 2(N − 1)ε′§. Let us compute
the probability of ECXˆ ,F to abort:
Pr(x,k)[abort]P = Pr(x,k)
[
∃ i : Dˆi = ∅
]
P
= 1− Pr(x,k)
[
Dˆi 6= ∅ ∀i
]
P
.
One of the possibilities for Dˆi not to be empty is x ∈ Dˆi ⇔ x ∈ Xˆ iki ⇔ P¯XKi(x, ki) 6= 0,
which is not obvious since x was generated through the distribution PXK. Therefore:
Pr(x,k)
[
Dˆi 6= ∅ ∀i
]
P
≥ Pr(x,k)
[
P¯XKi(x, ki) 6= 0∀i
]
P
. (B.26)
By employing the following inequality from probability theory (straightforward proof
based on union bound and de-Morgan’s law):
Pr
(
n⋂
i=1
Ai
)
≥
n∑
i=1
Pr(Ai)− (n− 1) (B.27)
where Pr(Ai) is the probability of event Ai, we are able to recast the r.h.s. of (B.26) as:
Pr(x,k)
[
Dˆi 6= ∅ ∀i
]
P
≥ Pr(x,k)
[
P¯XKi(x, ki) 6= 0∀i
]
P
≥
N−1∑
i=1
Pr(x,ki)
[
P¯XKi(x, ki) 6= 0
]
P
− [(N − 1)− 1] . (B.28)
§ Note that this EC protocol is defined by the distributions P¯XKi which are one by one 2ε′-close to the
marginals of the distribution PXK defining the EC protocol of part 1, which was shown to be 0-robust
on PXK. It is not straightforward to infer -unlike the bipartite case- that the new EC protocol is then
(N − 1) · 2ε′-robust on PXK.
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We now concentrate on computing Pr(x,ki)
[
P¯XKi(x, ki) 6= 0
]
P
, which is the probability
that, having generated the couple (x, ki) from distribution PXKi , it holds that
P¯XKi(x, ki) 6= 0. We employ the fact that by assumption (B.23) the distance between
the two involved distributions is bounded by 2ε′, which implies that, for instance:∣∣PXKi(x, ki)− P¯XKi(x, ki)∣∣ ≤ 2ε′ ∀ (x, ki) . (B.29)
Let us focus on the probability of the complementary event: Pr(x,ki)
[
P¯XKi(x, ki) = 0
]
P
.
Since this event is a sufficient condition for having PXKi(x, ki) ≤ 2ε′ (because of (B.29)),
this means that:
Pr(x,ki) [PXKi(x, ki) ≤ 2ε′]P ≥ Pr(x,ki)
[
P¯XKi(x, ki) = 0
]
P
, (B.30)
but the l.h.s of (B.30) can be bounded by:
Pr(x,ki) [PXKi(x, ki) ≤ 2ε′]P ≤ 2ε′ , (B.31)
therefore we have:
Pr(x,ki)
[
P¯XKi(x, ki) 6= 0
]
P
≥ 1− 2ε′ . (B.32)
Substituting in (B.28) yields:
Pr(x,k)
[
Dˆi 6= ∅ ∀i
]
P
≥ (N − 1)(1− 2ε′) + 1− (N − 1) = 1− (N − 1)2ε′ . (B.33)
With this result we can conclude that:
Pr(x,k)[abort]P = 1− Pr(x,k)
[
Dˆi 6= ∅ ∀i
]
P
≤ 2(N − 1)ε′
which concludes the proof. 
Appendix C. Quantifying the channel’s noise
As anticipated in Sec. 2, one can bound E’s knowledge about the secret key by
quantifying the noise she introduced in the quantum channel.
In this Section we show how the relevant noise parameters of both protocols can be
estimated from the finite statistics collected in PE.
Appendix C.1. N-BB84 protocol
In the N -BB84 protocol, the important noise parameters that are subsequently used
to characterize E’s knowledge are QnABi and Q
n
X , i.e. the frequency of discordant Z-
outcomes between A and Bi and the frequency of the outcome X
⊗N = −1, respectively.
Both frequencies refer to hypothetical measurements performed on the remaining n
signals following PE. The goal is to characterize the noise parameters based on what
is observed in PE (QmABi and Q
m
X). This is easily achieved by means of the following
Lemma (generalization of a result presented in [14, Suppl. Note 2]):
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Lemma 2 Let ε > 0. Let R be a random binary string of M = n+m bits with relative
Hamming weight ΛM =
1
M
|R|. Let R1, . . . , Rm be random variables obtained by sampling
m random entries of R without replacement. Then, upon defining:
Λm =
∑m
i=1Ri
m
=
|(R)m|
m
(C.1)
Λn =
|(R)n|
n
(C.2)
as the relative Hamming weights‖ of the two randomly chosen partitions of R, it holds:
Pr
[
1
2
|Λn − Λm|> ξ(ε, n,m)
]
≤ 2ε
Pr [Λn > Λm + 2ξ(ε, n,m)] ≤ ε
Pr [Λm > Λn + 2ξ(ε,m, n)] ≤ ε (C.3)
where:
ξ(ε, n,m) ≡
√
(n+m)(m+ 1)
8nm2
ln
(
1
ε
)
. (C.4)
Proof. Let’s first fix the random bit string R to a given and known string: R ≡ r;
thus also its relative Hamming weight is fixed to some real value: ΛM ≡ λM . Then it
holds [25, Theorem 1]:
Pr
[
|Λn − λM |> δ
∣∣∣ R = r,ΛM = λM] ≤ 2 e−2 nMm+1 δ2 (C.5)
Pr
[
Λn > λM + δ
∣∣∣ R = r,ΛM = λM] ≤ e−2 nMm+1 δ2 . (C.6)
By defining ν = m
M
, it is immediate to show the following facts for every µ ∈ R:
ΛM = νΛm + (1− ν)Λn
|Λn − ΛM |> νµ ⇐⇒ |Λn − Λm|> µ (C.7)
Λn > ΛM + νµ ⇐⇒ Λn > Λm + µ . (C.8)
Now one can make use of (C.5) and (C.7) in the following calculation:
Pr [|Λn − Λm|> µ] = Pr [|Λn − ΛM |> νµ]
=
∑
r
Pr [R = r] Pr
[
|Λn − λM |> νµ
∣∣∣ R = r,ΛN = λM]
≤
∑
r
Pr [R = r] 2 e−2
nM
m+1
m2
M2
µ2
= 2 e−2
nm2
(m+1)M
µ2 . (C.9)
Analogously, by using (C.6) and (C.8) one obtains:
Pr [Λn > Λm + µ] ≤ e−2
nm2
(m+1)M
µ2 . (C.10)
‖ We denote by (R)m the m-bit string composed by the random variables R1, . . . , Rm, while (R)n is
the n-bit string composed by the remaining entries of R.
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Finally, by choosing µ such that it holds: e−2
nm2
(m+1)M
µ2 = ε, i.e. µ = 2ξ(ε, n,m) with
ξ(ε, n,m) defined as in (C.4), one obtains from (C.9) and (C.10):
Pr
[
1
2
|Λn − Λm|> ξ(ε, n,m)
]
≤ 2ε
Pr [Λn > Λm + 2ξ(ε, n,m)] ≤ ε
which is exactly the claimed result in (C.3). The last expression in (C.3) is simply
obtained by exchanging the roles of n and m. 
In order to make use of Lemma 2, we define the following random vectors containing
the outcomes of A and Bi’s Z-measurement rounds devoted to PE:
(Za)j ≡
{
1 za,j = −1
0 za,j = 1
(Zi)j ≡
{
1 zi,j = −1
0 zi,j = 1
. (C.11)
Analogously, we define the random vectors containing the outcomes of A and B’s X-
measurement rounds:
(Xa)j ≡
{
1 xa,j = −1
0 xa,j = 1
(Xi)j ≡
{
1 xi,j = −1
0 xi,j = 1
. (C.12)
With these definitions, it holds:
(Xa ⊕X1 ⊕ . . .⊕XN−1)j =
 1
(
xa
∏N−1
i=1 xi
)
j
= −1
0
(
xa
∏N−1
i=1 xi
)
j
= 1
(C.13)
therefore it is immediate to verify that:
QmABi =
|Za ⊕ Zi|
m
QmX =
|Xa ⊕X1 ⊕ . . .⊕XN−1|
m
. (C.14)
Since we were able to write the frequencies QmABi and Q
m
X as relative Hamming weights
of random vectors, we can apply Lemma 2 and state that:
Pr
[
QnX ≤ QmX + 2ξ(εx, n,m) ∧ QnABi ≤ QmABi + 2ξ(εz, n,m) ∀i
] ≥ 1− ε2PE (C.15)
where we used (B.27) and defined:
εPE ≡
√
(N − 1)εz + εx . (C.16)
Appendix C.2. N-six-state protocol
In this case E is supposed to gain information about the key only via collective attacks,
i.e. she attacks each of the shared signals independently and identically†. Thus, the
needed noise parameters are the probabilities PX ,PABi and PZ computed on a single
N -qubit signal state, which in turn has a very simple expression [5, Eq. 11] thanks to
the extended depolarization procedure.
† Then the result is extended to coherent attacks via the PS technique, see Appendix D for the details.
Finite-key effects in multi-partite quantum key distribution protocols 27
The PE frequencies Qm
′
X , Q
m
ABi
and QmZ are thus observed on multiple copies of the same
N -qubit signal state. Therefore they constitute an estimation of the corresponding
probabilities by the Law of Large Numbers [26]:
Pr
[
1
2
|QmABi − PABi|≤ η(εz, 2,m) ∀ i ∧
1
2
|Qm′X − PX |≤ η(εx, 2,m′)
∧ 1
2
|QmZ − PZ |≤ η(ε′z, 2,m)
]
≥ 1− εPE (C.17)
where we used (B.27) and defined:
εPE ≡ ε′z + (N − 1)εz + εx (C.18)
η(ε, d,m) ≡
√
ln(1/ε) + d ln(m+ 1)
8m
. (C.19)
Appendix D. Derivation of the computable key lengths
In order to obtain a computable key length for the N -BB84 (Th. 3) and the N -six-state
(Th. 4) protocol starting from the general result (Th. 1), one needs to lower bound the
min-entropy (which quantifies E’s uncertainty about the key) and to upper bound the
leakage term with quantities depending on the channel’s noise.
In this Section we show how to achieve this task for both protocols and how to further
characterize the noise via the PE finite statistics, by using the results of Appendix C.
Concerning the notation, for the remainder of the Section we indicate with an apex
the number of signals described by the quantum state, and we also indicate as Z the
classical system containing A’s raw key bits (since in both protocols the raw keys are
generated by Z-basis measurements). Thus the quantum state describing the parties’
raw keys and E’s degree of freedom is indicated as: ρnZKE.
Appendix D.1. N-BB84 protocol
Leakage. The leakage of an optimal 1-way EC protocol (1.7) is bounded by the smooth
Re´nyi zero-entropy of the probability distribution of A and Bi’s raw keys (A.7). Note
that, thanks to (A.4), we can bound such an entropy by:
HεPE0 (P
n
ZKi
|Ki) ≤ HεPE,P0 (P nZKi|Ki) . (D.1)
In this way, one can follow the proof of [14, Lemma 3] and show that there exists a
probability distribution RnZKi ∈ BεPE,P(P nZKi) such that the frequency of discordant bits
(QnABi) is less or equal than Q
m
ABi
+ 2ξ(εz, n,m), with certainty. Note that this is not
true for the distribution P nZKi , since it holds condition (C.15).
This upper limit on the number of discordant bits between A and Bi, when the keys are
generated by RnZKi , allows one to bound the Re´nyi zero-entropy of such a distribution
by nh
(
QmABi + 2ξ(εz, n,m)
)
.
Finally, since the smooth Re´nyi entropy of order zero is defined with a minimization
over its ε-environment (A.7), one obtains:
HεPE,P0 (P
n
ZKi
|Ki) ≤ nh
(
QmABi + 2ξ(εz, n,m)
)
. (D.2)
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Combining (D.1) and (D.2) with Th. 2 leads to the desired result. The leakage occurring
in the N -BB84 protocol, implemented with the optimal 1-way, εEC-fully secure and
2(N − 1)εPE -robust EC protocol, is:
leakNQKDEC ≤ nmax
i
h
(
QmABi + 2ξ(εz, n,m)
)
+ log2
2(N − 1)
εEC
. (D.3)
Min-entropy. Let ρn+2mABE be the pure state describing the whole set of quantum signals
and E’s quantum system. The state ρnZE is then obtained by performing independent
Z-measurements on A’s subsystems and taking the partial trace over B’s ones, after
the PE procedure took place on 2m signals. If we now define ρnXB as the state obtained
by performing independent X-measurements on A’s subsystems and then taking the
partial trace over E, we can employ the uncertainty relation [11]:
H ε¯,Pmin (ρ
n
ZE|E) ≥ q −H ε¯,Pmax (ρnXB|B) (D.4)
where q = − log2 c, with:
c = max
z,x
‖(Pz1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pzn)(Px1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pxn)‖2∞ (D.5)
and Pz1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Pzn , Px1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Pxn are the projectors implementing the Z- and X-
measurements on A’s subsystems, respectively. In particular, Pzi ∈ {P|0〉, P|1〉} and
Pxi ∈ {P|+〉, P|−〉}. Therefore one can easily compute the quality factor q in this specific
case: q = n‡.
We can now bound the max-entropy (A.15) of the classical-quantum states ρnXB by
performing the same projective measurement on all B’s subsystems and by employing
the data processing inequality [24, Theorem 6.2]:
H ε¯,Pmax (ρ
n
XB|B) ≤ H ε¯,Pmax (ρnXX|X) (D.6)
which inserted in (D.4) yields:
H ε¯,Pmin (ρ
n
ZE|E) ≥ n−H ε¯,Pmax (ρnXX|X) . (D.7)
Finally one can bound the max-entropy of the classical state ρnXX, - i.e. of the probability
distribution P nXX - by means of [14, Lemma 3]. As a matter of fact, one can consider
the whole set of B as one single Bob with the X-outcomes vector defined as:
X′ = X1 ⊕ . . .⊕XN−1 , (D.8)
where the random vectors are defined in (C.12). Under this classical operation the data
processing inequality holds:
H ε¯,Pmax (ρ
n
XX|X) = H ε¯,Pmax (P nXX|X) ≤ H ε¯,Pmax (P nXX′|X ′) . (D.9)
In this fashion, the PE parameter QmX is exactly the frequency of discordant bits between
Xa and X
′ (see its definition in (C.14)). Therefore one can apply [14, Lemma 3]:
HεPE,Pmax (P
n
XX′ |X ′) ≤ nh (QmX + 2ξ(εx, n,m)) (D.10)
‡ The norm ‖·‖∞ evaluates the largest singular value.
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which combined with (D.9) yields:
HεPE,Pmax (ρ
n
XX|X) ≤ nh (QmX + 2ξ(εx, n,m)) . (D.11)
Finally inserting (D.11) in (D.7) after having fixed: ε¯ = εPE, yields the desired result:
HεPE,Pmin (ρ
n
ZE|E) ≥ n(1− h (QmX + 2ξ(εx, n,m))) . (D.12)
Computable key length. By employing the bounds on the leakage (D.3) and on the
min-entropy (D.12) in Th. 1, one obtains the computable key length presented in Th. 3,
which only depends on the PE statistics and on the security parameters.
Appendix D.2. N-six-state protocol
As anticipated in Subsec. 2.1, the strategy adopted to achieve a computable expression
of the N -six-state key length relies on the PS technique [12]. Such a technique allows
to prove a given property of a quantum channel, acting on a general multipartite state,
by just proving it on inputs consisting of identical and independent copies of a state on
a single subsystem. Therefore one can infer the security of a QKD protocol -viewed as
a quantum channel- under coherent attacks (arbitrary input) from the security of the
same protocol under collective attacks (product state input) [27]. For this reason in the
following we restrict E’s action to collective attacks, meaning that the quantum state
describing the parties’ raw keys and E’s quantum system is a product state: ρ⊗nZKE, and
the raw keys’ probability distribution is a product distribution: (PZK)
n.
Leakage. We start from the general upper bound stated in (1.7) and employ the finite
version of the AEP for probability distributions [28, Theorem 1] to further bound the
smooth Re´nyi zero-entropy (A.7):
HεPE0 ((PZKi)
n|Ki) ≤ n
[
H(Z|Ki) + log2(5)
√
2 log2(1/(2εPE))
n
]
(D.13)
where we fixed ε′ = εPE as defined in (C.18) and where H(Z|Ki) is the conditional
Shannon entropy of PZKi . Thanks to the symmetries introduced by the extended
depolarization procedure [5] each raw key bit is uniform: H(Z) = H(Ki) = 1. These
constraints on the probability distribution PZKi imply that its conditional entropy
H(Z|Ki) can be expressed as a function of the only parameter PABi as follows:
H(Z|Ki) = h(PABi).
Finally, we characterize the probability PABi through the observed frequency Q
m
ABi
in
PE (C.17). In particular, we exploit the composable-security property by adding εPE to
the total security parameter and by maximizing (D.13) over the allowed probabilities.
Combining this with Th. 2 leads to the desired result. The leakage occurring in
the N -six-state protocol, implemented with the optimal 1-way, εEC-fully secure and
2(N − 1)εPE -robust EC protocol, is:
leakNQKDEC ≤ n
[
max
i
h
(
QmABi + 2η(εz, 2,m)
)
+ log2(5)
√
2 log2(1/(2εPE))
n
]
+ log2
2(N − 1)
εEC
. (D.14)
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Min-entropy. We can bound the min-entropy of a product state via the finite version
of the AEP for quantum states, reported in [29, Equation B7]:
H ε¯min(ρ
⊗n
ZE|E) ≥ n
(
S(ρZE)− S(ρE)− 5
√
log2(1/ε¯)
n
)
, (D.15)
where S(ρ) is the Von Neumann entropy. The r.h.s. of (D.15) can be recast in terms of
the probabilities PX and PZ , by following analogous steps in [5] and by exploiting the
symmetries of the single-signal state due to the extended depolarization procedure.
Finally, the probabilities PX and PZ are characterized by the PE measurements through
(C.17). Thus we can minimize the min-entropy bound over the allowed probabilities
while adding the PE failure probability εPE to the total security parameter. These
operations yield:
H ε¯min(ρ
⊗n
ZE|E) ≥ n inf
ΓPE
[(
1− PZ
2
− PX
)
log2
(
1− PZ
2
− PX
)
+
(
PX − PZ
2
)
log2
(
PX − PZ
2
)
+ (1− PZ) (1− log2(1− PZ))− 5
√
log2(1/ε¯)
n
]
(D.16)
where the set ΓPE is defined in (2.6).
Computable key length. By substituting the bounds (D.14) and (D.16) into Th. 1,
one obtains the computable key length of the N -six-state protocol when performed
under collective attacks.
The PS technique [12] allows to extend the security of a protocol against collective
attacks, to any kind of attack, by just shortening the key length and introducing a
corrective factor on the total security parameter. Consider an NQKD protocol E acting
on L-partite systems (the L shared signals), where each of the L constituents has
dimension d (in our case each signal describes the state of N qubits, thus d = 2N).
If E is εtot-secure against collective attacks, then the protocol E ′ obtained from E by
shortening the output of the hashing by “2(d2 − 1) log2(L+ 1)” bits is (L+ 1)(d2−1)εtot-
secure against coherent attacks. By applying the PS corrections to the N -six-state key
valid for collective attacks, we extend its validity to coherent attacks, yielding the final
result: Th. 4.
Appendix E. Information leaked from the classical channel
The following Lemma is the result of a private communication [10] with Renato Renner.
It shows that the additional information that E has about A’s raw key X due to EC’s
classical communication can be quantified by the leakage (as defined in Def. 4), even for
a general two-way EC protocol. The proof relies on the fact that the ε-environment of
the entropies is defined via the purified distance. The crucial advantage of this definition
of distance is that one can always find extensions and purifications of quantum states
without increasing their distance [30].
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Lemma 3 Let ρXKCE be a density operator with X,K,C classical, such that the Markov
chain condition C↔ (X,K)↔ E holds. Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
Hε,Pmin(ρXCE|CE) ≥ Hε,Pmin(ρXE|E)−H0(ρC) +Hmin(ρXKC|ρXK) . (E.1)
Proof. We first prove the statement in the special case where ε = 0. This is achieved
by the following chain of inequalities:
Hmin(ρXCE|CE)
(1)
≥ Hmin(ρXCE|E)−H0(ρC)
(2)
≥ Hmin(ρXCE|ρXE) +Hmin(ρXE|E)−H0(ρC)
(3)
≥ Hmin(ρXKCE|ρXKE) +Hmin(ρXE|E)−H0(ρC)
(4)
≥ Hmin(ρXKC|ρXK) +Hmin(ρXE|E)−H0(ρC) (E.2)
where we used: (1) chain rule [8, Section 3.1.3], (2) Proposition 1 at the end of this
Section, (3) strong subadditivity [8, Lemma 3.1.7], and (4) Markov chain condition.
To prove the general statement, for any ε ≥ 0, let ρ′XE be the state ε-close to ρXE (with
respect to the purified distance) such that:
Hε,Pmin(ρXE|E) = Hmin(ρ′XE|E) . (E.3)
Thanks to the definition of purified distance we can find an extension of ρ′XE, namely
ρ′XKE, such that it is still ε-close to ρXKE = TrC[ρXKCE] [30, Corollary 9]. We can
assume, without loss of generality, that ρ′XKE is classical on X and K and that ρ
′
XK has
support contained in the support of ρXK§. Furthermore, let RXK→XKC be the CPTP
recovery map that recovers C from (X,K), i.e.: ρXKC = RXK→XKC(ρXK). Since X, K
and C are classical, this map can be chosen to be of the form:
RXK→XKC : QXK 7→
∑
x,k,c
PC|XK(c|x,k)〈x|〈k|QXK|x〉|k〉 |x〉〈x| ⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ |c〉〈c| (E.4)
where PC|XK is the conditional probability distribution defined by the EC protocol
which led to the given state ρXKCE. According to the definition of min-entropy (A.9),
for any QXK that is classical on X and K we have that:
Hmin(RXK→XKC(QXK)|QXK) = − log2 λ (E.5)
where λ is the minimum real number that satisfies the inequality:
λ idC ⊗QXK −
∑
x,k,c
PC|XK(c|x,k)〈x|〈k|QXK|x〉|k〉|x〉〈x| ⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ |c〉〈c| ≥ 0 ,
or equivalently:
λ− PC|XK(c|x,k) ≥ 0 ∀x,k, c : 〈x|〈k|QXK|x〉|k〉 > 0 . (E.6)
§ It is always possible to turn subsystems into classical ones by applying a CPTP map that projects
onto the elements of a fixed “classical” basis. Note that such a map cannot increase the distance
between states.
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The minimum λ satisfying (E.6) is the maximum eigenvalue of the non-normalized state∑
c PC|XK(c|x,k)|c〉〈c|, further maximized over x and k. Thus from [8, Remark 3.1.3]
combined with (E.5) we get:
Hmin(RXK→XKC(QXK)|QXK) = inf
x,k : 〈x|〈k|QXK|x〉|k〉>0
Hmin
(∑
c
PC|XK(c|x,k)|c〉〈c|
)
.(E.7)
Because ρXKCE satisfies the Markov condition C↔ (X,K)↔ E, we have:
ρXKCE = (RXK→XKC ⊗ idE)(ρXKE) . (E.8)
Therefore, defining:
ρ′XKCE = (RXK→XKC ⊗ idE)(ρ′XKE) (E.9)
and using the fact that CPTP maps cannot increase the distance between states, ρ′XKCE
is ε-close to ρXKCE, so that:
Hε,Pmin(ρXCE|CE) ≥ Hmin(ρ′XCE|CE) . (E.10)
Furthermore, since supp(ρ′XK) ⊆ supp(ρXK), the action of the recovery map is such
that supp(ρ′C) ⊆ supp(ρC), and hence by [8, Remark 3.1.3] it holds:
H0(ρC) ≥ H0(ρ′C) . (E.11)
Note also that, because of (E.7), the min-entropy of C conditioned on X and K of any
classical state QXK only depends on the recovery map RXK→XKC and on the support
of QXK. Since the support of ρ
′
XK is contained in the support of ρXK, we have:
Hmin(ρXKC|ρXK) ≤ Hmin(ρ′XKC|ρ′XK) . (E.12)
Since ρ′XKCE by construction satisfies the Markov chain condition, inequality (E.2) also
holds for this operator, i.e.:
Hmin(ρ
′
XCE|CE) ≥ Hmin(ρ′XKC|ρ′XK) +Hmin(ρ′XE|E)−H0(ρ′C) . (E.13)
Combining (E.13), (E.3), (E.10), (E.11) and (E.12) yields the claim. 
Proposition 1 For any density operator ρABC:
Hmin(ρABC |C) ≥ Hmin(ρABC |ρBC) +Hmin(ρBC |C) . (E.14)
Proof. By definition of min-entropy (A.12), there exists a density operator σC such that:
ρBC ≤ 2−Hmin(ρBC |C)idB ⊗ σC . (E.15)
We thus have:
ρABC ≤ 2−Hmin(ρABC |ρBC)idA ⊗ ρBC ≤ 2−Hmin(ρABC |ρBC)−Hmin(ρBC |C)idAB ⊗ σC (E.16)
which implies the claim. 
